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From Theory to Bricolage: 
Indiscipline and the Exemplary Gestures of Interpretation
ABSTRACT
This article  suggests that our supposedly “post-theoretical” age is more than ever in
need of the intellectual gestures which characterized theory in its various guises. After a brief
historical schematization of the recent evolutions of theory, it distinguishes four dimensions
of intellection (accounting, modeling, storytelling, speculating), which are constantly weaved
together  whenever we attempt to make sense of our world.  It  then shows that  these four
dimensions are all included in the activity of interpretation, which deserves to appear as a
continuation of theory by other means. In dialogue with Wlad Godzich, Steven Knapp and
Walter Ben Michaels, Daniele Giglioli or Claude Lévi-Strauss, it re-describes interpretation as
a form of indiscipline closer to the bricolage of “the savage mind” than to the unrealistic
idealization of modern “Science”. It concludes, however, by rejecting such dichotomies and
by calling for “theoricolage” as an indisciplinary and cheerful mix of theory and bricolage.
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As a French speaker working for a dozen years in US academia around the 1990s, I
always  found  it  uncanny  (and  slightly  worrying)  to  hear  my  native  colleagues  speak  of
“Theory”  in  an  absolute  sense.  Even  when  the  “theorists”  for  whom  I  had  the  highest
admiration defined “theory as a practice of dissidence and of echoing the cry” (Godzich 1994,
31), I felt uneasy and puzzled by the very possibility to refer to “theory” as such, i.e., without
specifying  who’s or  what theory one had in mind.  As far as I was concerned, there were
theories (in the plural), contradicting or completing each other, calling for each one of us to
choose, reject, discuss, denounce, correct, refine, pursue, deepen them.
Much to my dismay,  I realized that the MA students in my 2011 course in Literary
Theory at the University of Grenoble also referred to “la théorie” in the singular rather than in
the  plural.  When  I  asked  them  why  they  registered  in  the  class,  their  response  was
straightforward:  because  it  was  compulsory.  After  twelve  weeks  of  (enforced)  weekly
meetings, while some of them acknowledged having enjoyed and benefited from the class,
they remained unanimous in suggesting a change of title: the reference to “la théorie” had no
appeal whatsoever, working rather as a strong repellent. They did not see what was to be
gained in theory: they wanted to read literary texts, discuss them, their form, their agency,
their relevance, their impact—but theory was an obstacle rather than a help to do so. 
My French colleagues were typically unaffected by such feedback. Students, after all,
don’t know what’s good for them: that’s why they learn, and that’s why we teach. They’ll
realize later how important theory (or literary history, or methodology) is, when they grow up.
As a firm believer in Jacques Rancière’s presupposition of the equality of intelligence, I find
it harder to disqualify my students’ perceptions and claims. I’d rather hear them as a symptom
of a certain obsolescence of “theory”.  More precisely,  I suspect that their  rejection of “la
théorie” deeply resonates with my own uneasiness towards “theory”. When theory becomes
absolutized and essentialized, as symptomatized by the use of the singular to refer to it, time
may have come to move on and rid ourselves of a label now lacking in traction.
In this  article,  however,  I  will  not join the large chorus of those who announce the
“death of theory”—whether  to  bemoan or  to  celebrate  it—and see us enter  a new “post-
theoretical” era (see for instance McMillan 1999; Butler 2000; Eagleton 2003; Callus 2004;
Zublena 2011). Instead, I will attempt briefly to sketch an evolution of theory, which looks
simultaneously and somewhat contradictorily like an involution (turning back onto itself) and
like an unfolding (opening up to spread into every domain of action). It would indeed be a
good thing if theory (in the singular) was nowhere to be found—if only it meant that it is now
diffusely present and active everywhere. 
It may be a good starting point to appropriate for our topic what Frank Zappa famously
said about jazz: Theory is not dead, it just smells funny. How did it come to smell that way?
What exactly does it  now smell  like? What  is to be done with that  smell?  These are the
questions I will address in the following pages.
From Pre-History to Post-Theory
The evolution of the references made to “theory”, over the past 50 years, can be roughly
summarized  in  three  main  phases.  Around the  1950s,  during what  I  would  call  the  pre-
historic age of theory, there were many competing theories, attached to many different fields,
with several candidates struggling for prominence within each discipline. These theories in
the plural, however, were all but pluralistic: each of them claimed to provide the only true and
valid definition and framing of its object. There were many, but each was animated with an
exclusivist urge. The most common rivalries opposed Marxist approaches to bourgeois points
of view, holism to individualism, deductive modeling to empiricist induction. In spite of their
constant struggles, all the competitors shared a number of common features: they claimed to
be scientific, systematic, objective, they throve on binary oppositions and on the working out
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of contradictions, they saw their competition as geared towards a common progress of human
knowledge. In other words, to borrow from Bruno Latour (1991, 168 & 2012, 520), they
believed they were “modern”.
This pre-historic age is far from over: a lot of scientists still  live in it (more or less
happily),  mapping  the  advancement  of  their  discipline  through  Popperian  refutations  and
Kuhnian paradigm shifts. As a matter of fact, we are all pre-historic theorists insofar as our
work  is  structured  by  disciplined  forms  of  research.  Any  discipline  rests  on  a  certain
systematicity, on efforts towards objectivity, towards the avoidance of self-contradictions, etc.
We may very well “never have been modern”, but our disciplinary endeavors were—and still
are.
“Theory” entered into its historical age as an attempt to break with this modernity. The
most suggestive description of this attempt, and of its puzzling implications, was provided by
Wlad Godzich, who played a central role in the development of theory in the USA as co-
editor of the series “Theory and History of Literature” at the University of Minnesota Press.
As François Cusset analyzed it in his book French Theory, this historical age was dominated
by references to “Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze, and the Yale School” (Godzich, 1994,
19). Its “fundamental concern” was “difference”—which, on the face of it, makes it all the
more puzzling that it consistently referred to itself in the singular (theory, difference) rather
than  in  the  plural.  In  using  “difference”  to  denounce  and  undermine  “the  project  of  an
exhaustive ordering of things and practices” pushed forward by the (Hegelian) ambition of
modern  Science  (Godzich  1994,24),  French  theory  was  led  to  develop  a  very  peculiar
sensibility  and endeavor of its  own, which Wlad Godzich cleverly articulates  in terms of
“dissidence” and of “echoing of a cry”:
Difference-sensitive  theory  has  recognized  and  thematized  something  that  had
escaped  earlier  thought:  the  cry.  It  is  a  philosophy of  the  cry,  a  cry  constituted  by
difference in all of its avatars. […] A dissident is someone who denounces, and bears
witness to, the abyss that separates reality from its official version. A dissident’s stance
draws attention to and inhabits this difference, letting it progressively inscribe itself in the
dissident’s very body. […] Theory as a practice of dissidence and of echoing the cry thus
situates itself at the intersection of the cry and of the System, and its practice consists in
inventing gestures that are, at one and the same time, dedicated to the cry and a demand
for  an  accounting  from  the  System.  This  uncomfortable  position  is  that  of  theory
marginalizing itself, for such a practice of theory could not seek to occupy the center.
(Godzich, 1994, 26 & 31)
Although “difference” has many “avatars”, theory—in its historical age—searched and
nurtured  it  as  a  vector  for  the  repeated  self-same  gesture  of  pointing  to  “the  abyss  that
separates  reality  from its  official  version”.  Theory “marginalized  itself”  from the theories
elaborated in its pre-historical age, as soon as they became accepted by “the System” as a part
of its “official version” of reality. 
The “cry” expresses that which resists against being reduced to the official version of
reality promoted by “the System”: native Indians displaced from their ancestral lifeworld by
the invasion of modernity, along with its science, technology and mining companies; gay and
lesbians  whose  “queer”  behavior  blurs  the  dichotomies  between  male  and  female;
steelworkers  who  hang  on  to  their  industrial  jobs  against  the  promise  of  immaterial
production; poets whose voice has no place left in a communicative universe dominated by
the circulation of commodities and information. Theory took it on itself to hear and echo such
cries: its form of dissidence consisted in becoming a porte-parole, a voice for the voiceless,
elevating the cry to the status of a “demand for an accounting from the System”.
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In this second phase, theory set itself up for what could hardly be anything else than a
history of necessary failure and repeated disappointments. At least three factors can explain
the necessarily doomed nature of this historical phase.
First, a dissident only pursues her dissidence as long as she maintains a very fragile
balance  between  a  capacity  to  be  heard  (without  which  she  simply  does  not  exist  as  a
dissident)  and  a  capacity  not to  be  heard  (since  she  ceases  being  a  dissident  when  she
becomes accounted for by the System). This “uncomfortable position” explains why theory
and difference were led to conceive of themselves in the singular: as soon as  this particular
cry, this particular form of difference and dissidence can be named, identified, distinguished,
categorized, they are absorbed by the System, accounted for within the projected “exhaustive
ordering of things and practices”. Marginalizing oneself is therefore bound to be an endlessly
vanishing task, since one exists (in the margin) only as long as one does not exist (for the
System, from which one can never completely break apart).
Second,  as  Wlad  Godzich  himself  clearly  identified  at  the  end  of  his  essay,  this
“uncomfortable position” raised not only ontological or epistemological difficulties, but also
socio-professional  ones:  “this  is  the  gravest  menace  to  theory  today:  its  professionalized
simulacrum, well  ensconced in the system of knowledge, usurping the voice of the Other
while silencing it and the practice of resistance that is genuine theory” (Godzich 1994, 33).
Theorists, like everyone else, need bread and incomes: they look for (academic) jobs and, if
lucky,  get  to  teach  the  current  “system  of  knowledge”;  they  are  sometimes  led  to  run
departments and, as representatives of the System, they have to account for other people’s
actions, caught in the process of writing the official version of reality. All of this makes it
difficult to be (and remain) a dissident.
Third, difference and dissidence are caught in the same self-destructive trapping on the
methodological level as on the socio-professional level. While each of the many avatars of the
cry  would  require  its  own  peculiar  treatment,  “deconstruction”  soon  became  an  all-
encompassing method of its own, a rigid discipline geared towards debunking all disciplines.
The demise of theory-as-difference was already inscribed in the (in)famous article written by
Steven  Knapp  and  Walter  Benn  Michaels  as  early  as  1982  under  the  provocative  title
“Against Theory”:
By “theory” we mean a special project in literary criticism: the attempt to govern
interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general.
[… Theory] is the name for all the ways people have tried to stand outside practice in
order  to  govern  practice  from without.  Our  thesis  has  been that  no one can  reach a
position  outside  practice,  that  theorists  should  stop  trying,  and  that  the  theoretical
enterprise should therefore come to an end. (Knapp and Benn Michaels 1982, 723 & 742)
Our supposedly “post-theoretical”  age  was  already written  in  the  very dynamics  of
theory, whose historical phase was bound to be a repetitive exercise in self-destruction. Yes,
theory,  in  its  deconstructionist  guise,  became  “an  account  of  interpretation  in  general”,
imposed from above by a System of departmental chairs and committees in order to govern
interpretations  of  particular  texts,  along  the  mainstream  doxa  and  dogma  of  endless
marginalization.  Yes,  it  became a discipline,  entering  the  same competition  for  exclusive
domination which characterized the pre-historical claims of the (plural though anti-pluralist)
theories. The history of this phase of theory has clearly run its course for at least a decade, and
it is therefore accurate to describe our age as “post-theoretical”.
Yet,  since  the  stabilization  of  theory  in  “its  professionalized  simulacrum,  well
ensconced in the system of knowledge” was an “usurpation” of its true dissident dynamics,
we could as well claim that theory has a better chance to realize its promise now that it is
again marginalized from most of the institutions it briefly conquered (or usurped). Apart from
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the paradoxical fact that French theory never conquered any real power in French institutions,
my students’ scorn for theory in Grenoble bears witness to its current (re)marginalization. We
are  indeed  in  a  “post-theory”  age  when  we  compare  our  current  discussions  with  this
observation  made  by Wlad  Godzich  two decades  ago:  “in  spite  of  a  constant  barrage  of
denunciations of its ephemeral faddishness and predictions of its imminent demise, theory has
managed  to  occupy  an  inordinate  amount  of  our  attention  and has  imposed  itself  as  the
defining characteristic of an entire generation of scholarship” (Godzich, 1994, 15). 
My  students’  generation  does  not  even  bother  to  denounce  the  faddishness,  the
abstraction  or the jargon of theoretical  pyrotechnics:  they just  don’t  care.  They only take
theory courses because well-ensconced professors and chairs have made them compulsory in
the current system of knowledge acquisition.  It  would be fair  to reply that incoming MA
students in French or CompLit in the 1980s at Yale also took theory as a form of bad-tasting
medicine,  because  chairs  had  made  it  (officially  or  implicitly)  compulsory.  Theory  did
nevertheless manage “to occupy an inordinate amount of our attention” in these days, which
certainly is no longer the case. No one pays attention anymore. My student take it as an old-
fashioned ritual, as a medication they know to be a mere placebo.
Does living in a “post-theory” age mean, as Steven Knapp and Walter Ben Michaels
prophetically claimed, that we should “stop trying to stand outside practice in order to govern
practice from the outside”, because “no-one can reach a position outside practice”, calling for
“the theoretical practice to come to an end”? I certainly do not believe so. The rest of my
reflection  will  suggest  that  the  theoretical  urge—in  its  pre-historical  “modern”  form  of
progressive systematicity and in its historical form of echoing the cry—is in a better position
than ever to accomplish its enlightening practice of dissidence, now that the dominance of
“theory” is a thing of the past. My claim will be that indisciplinary interpretation is now our
chance to pursue theory through other (better) means.
Four Dimensions of Intellection
Theory’s self-demise was inscribed in its inconsistent relation to pluralism, reducing the
multiple ways of knowing, of crying and of resisting to the mere “avatars” of a one same self-
perpetuating  principle  of  “Difference”.  The indisciplinary  approach  I  am advocating  here
attempts to reconcile the (modern) effort to elaborate systematic accounts of our lifeworld
with the (postmodern) intuition that dissidence carries both the dynamics of progress and the
antidote to the excesses committed in the name of progress. 
If important knowledge mostly comes from the margins, we need to put ourselves in
position to integrate difference without neutralizing it, which is why  pluralism is our most
fundamental  requirement.  A truly  indisciplinary  approach should  give  pluralism a radical
form. In reaction against the exclusive claims which animated theories of the pre-historical
age—each competing to assert its own truth by attacking the assertions made by its rivals—
we should go as far as pre-supposing that  all forms of knowledge have some truth in them,
and, conversely, that  no form of knowledge can pretend to be valid thru and thru. We need
pluralism because our collective intelligence is necessarily situated  in between the various
forms of knowledge currently at our disposal; we need this pluralism to be as large, inclusive,
flexible, tolerant as possible because even the most wacky theory has something to contribute
to it.
Against the inherent and necessary tendency of any discipline to isolate one approach
and one layer of reality upon which it concentrates its attention, we need to conceive of any
intellectual endeavor as a variable mix of at least four different types of activity. I will briefly
sketch these four types, which can be seen as four dimensions of intellection.
1. The  first  dimension  consists  in  accounting,  i.e.,  in  observing,  categorizing,
numbering, quantifying and describing certain segments of reality isolated within the constant
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flow  of  stimuli  that  reach  our  sensory  apparatus  during  our  waking  hours.  At  the  most
mundane and banal level, we perform this activity at every second of the day, in order to be
aware of our environment and to react to its evolution in the manner most appropriate to our
functional needs. But it is the same type of activity which is performed, along much more
complex  mediations,  when a  physicist  sends  subatomic  particles  to  crash  into  each other
within a supercollider, when a sociologist painfully gathers data about standards of living and
educational  levels,  when  a  trader  attempts  to  get  a  clear  idea  of  a  company’s  potential
profitability, or when a poet twists our common language in order to devise a more accurate
way to account for our subjective experiences.
The task of accounting requires us to select certain data as relevant and to quantify their
iterations. It looks flatly “empiricist” (observing what’s there), and therefore “pre-theoretical”,
only if we forget that relevance results from a very complex weaving of sensitivities, interests,
attachments,  meanings  and interpretations.  We only  pay attention  to  data  that  have  been
selected because of their possible impact on certain practices that matter to us. Facts and data
never impose themselves upon us, they are “matters of fact” only because they have been
previously experienced as “matters of concern”.
Apart from its analytical aspect of distinguishing and numbering segments of reality, the
task of accounting consists mostly in the art of aggregating heterogeneous data. It is an art of
translation,  of  devising  common  measures  able  to  draw together,  compare,  align,  equate
originally incommensurable things (Akrich et al. 2006, 11). Its specific challenge comes from
the  difficulty  to  find  the  proper  measuring  stick  telling  us  when  different  things  can  be
counted as one, as many or as equivalent.
2. Far from being reducible to mere observation, accounting is therefore intimately tied
to a second type of activity, for which we can propose the generic name of modeling. While
accounting approaches reality in synchronic terms of time-slices (what is to be counted at a
given moment within a given field of observation?), modeling rests on an effort to predict
diachronic transformations referred to causal explanations. These two activities are developed
in constant conjunction: I will pay attention to something, I will consider it as relevant, and I
will try to isolate it in the flow of sensory stimuli, only on the basis of a certain “model”—or
of a “scheme”, to follow the powerful insights and terminology developed in Philippe Descola
2005. This is the foundation of the principle of relevance (or pertinence): I isolate a segment
of reality only because I was led to believe it may play a causal role in processes that are of
interest to my practices.
Modeling rests on past experiences in order to project expectations in the future, on the
basis of hypotheses of causal relations. It roughly corresponds to the scientific theories of the
pre-historical age, without perpetuating the ideological divide between the supposed certainty
of modern Science and the pragmatic trials-and-errors of savage “bricolage” (Levi Strauss
1966,  more  on this  later).  Both accounting  and modeling  presuppose  a view from above,
illustrated by the cartographic gaze, the physicist’s system of equations and the architect’s
miniature model. This view from above has long been thought to be central to the definition
of  theory,  referring  back  to  its  etymological  origin  of  theôria (θεωρία,  “contemplation”,
“observation”): to “theorize” is to look at a part of reality from a certain distance and with a
certain pretense to superiority. While this aspect tended explicitly to be denied by difference-
sensitive theory, it nevertheless animated (and haunted) its very practice: its much criticized
“jargon”  resulted  from an  attempt  to  take  distance  towards  the  cry,  in  order  to  map  its
conditions of emergence, its meaning, its implications, and its possible future agency.
3. The third type of activity,  storytelling, may appear as a mere variation on modeling.
It too attempts to follow the temporal unfolding of transformations occurring in our, or in
someone else’s, living experience; it too leads us to project causal explanations (propter hoc)
on chronological successions (post hoc). A story is indeed a “model”, as Paul Ricoeur has
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convincingly shown in Time and Narrative, and as economists still suggest in their everyday
language, when they say that “they have a story” (i.e., a theory) to explain a certain set of
empirical observations.
We  should  however  follow  anthropologist  Tim  Ingold  when  he  characterizes
storytelling by a certain type of movement, which he relates to “wayfaring” as illustrated by
the hunters and gatherers’ walks in the forests. In contrast to our modern ways of life which
favor both “transport” (a movement across, going from point A to point B in the most direct
and speedy fashion) and “survey” (a movement up, in a tower, a helicopter, an airplane or a
satellite), hunters and gatherers walk along unpredictable paths, turning right or veering left in
order to follow one prey’s track or to get nearer to another prey’s cry. While we can sleep or
read  a  book  during  transport  in  a  train,  while  the  surveying  gaze  provides  us  with  a
deterritorialized  point  of  view,  wayfaring  is  defined  by  “the  intimate  bond  that  couples
locomotion and perception” (Ingold, 2007, 78). 
Such  is  also  the  type  of  intellectual  movement  generated  by  storytelling,  which
distinguishes  it  from  the  activity  of  modeling:  even  if  narratives  usually  include  an
explanatory  dimension,  their  characteristic  mode  of  experience  consists  in  espousing  the
wayfarer’s point of view along her path of life. “It is in the art of storytelling, not in the power
of  classification,  that  the  key  to  human  knowledgeability—and  therefore  to  culture—
ultimately resides”. We need stories to draw and weave “together what classifications split
apart” (Ingold 2011, 160 & 164):
To tell a story is to relate, in narrative, the occurrences of the past, bringing them to
life in the vivid present of listeners as if they were going on here and now. Here, the
meaning of the “relation” has to be understood quite literally, not as a connection between
predetermined  entities,  but  as  the  retracing  of  a  path  through  the  terrain  of  lived
experience. […] To tell, in short, is not to represent the world, but to trace a path through
it that others can follow. (Ingold, 2011, 161)
This is precisely why difference-sensitive theory was so intimately linked to literature,
whether  in  its  academic  location  (departments  of  French,  English,  Spanish,  Comparative
Literature) or in the emphasis it put on the notion of “writing”.  Implicitly or explicitly,  it
tended to put accounting and modeling on the side of “the System” (with its ordering and
mapping of things and practices, under the dominance of a surveying gaze), while putting
itself  on  the  side  of  dissidents  whose  emblematic  figures  were  storytellers.  A  narrative
provides a much more appropriate venue than a theory for “echoing the cry”.  It is in the
wayfarer’s experience that we can find the strongest potential for dissidence and resistance,
since the wayfarer remains as close as possible to reality, at the field level, while the theorist
always runs the risk of being disconnected from reality by the abstraction of his classifications
and superior gaze.
4. My fourth dimension of intellection could also be considered as a variation or as a
particular aspect of modeling, but, here too, I find it important simultaneously to stress the
vicinity and the difference in nature between these various activities.  Speculating not only
provides possible explanations on future course of events, it also includes a strongly reflexive
dimension: the  speculum is first and foremost a “mirror”, which allows a person to look at
herself,  to  make  sense  of  her  own  image  within  the  surroundings  in  which  it  appears.
Speculating gives theory its (self-)critical and (self-)reflexive stance, which tends to permeate
the  three  activities  previously  mentioned:  counting  and  aggregating,  explaining  and
predicting, narrating and expressing only enter the theoretical domain insofar as they include
some form of awareness of their own gestures and problems.
In addition to this reflexive stance, the speculative activity has recently been reinvested
with new meaning, thanks in part to Quentin Meillassoux’s surprisingly popular essay After
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Finitude.  By  claiming  that  the  only  necessary  principle  is  to  be  found  in  the  absolute
contingency of all things and events, Meillassoux’s metaphysics open up a (very abstract but
nevertheless very open) space for the exploration of the possible. While the recent grouping of
continental  philosophers  as  diverse  as  Meillassoux,  Deleuze,  Guattari,  Badiou,  Latour  or
Žižek under the single umbrella of a co-called “speculative turn” remains subject to debate,
the attempt  to  “aim at  something ‘beyond’  the critical  and linguistic  turns”,  expressing a
renewed form of “realism and materialism” animated with “a concern with the Absolute”
suggests a curious emerging mix of ontological ambition and creative self-assertion (Bryant et
al, 2011, 3).
What does it mean for someone to “speculate”, after all, if not to look beyond the actual
reality as it is given to our senses, in order better to envision another possible world? While
accounting and modeling attempt to describe the given state of reality (as it stands and as it
works), while storytelling can refer to the sequences of events that happened in the actual
world,  speculating  is  intrinsically  linked to worldmaking,  and to  projecting oneself  into a
universe of fiction.  The speculative question could be phrased as follows: how can I  see
myself realistically living in a different actual world?
Four Modalities of Interpretation
As it should be clear by now, the four types of activities I just listed do not attempt to be
clearly and distinctly separated from each other. They constantly overlap within each effort
we make in order to situate ourselves in the world. I presented them as four dimensions of
intellection precisely to suggest that they always come in a (slightly different) bundle, in the
same way as any physical object can be perceived in terms of length and height and depth.
My claim can thus be stated as follows: the theoretical drives—which can no longer be
conceived in the singular but which must put plurality at the core of their self-definition—
constantly invent a myriad of practical modes of weaving together the four threads of activity
described above as accounting, modeling, storytelling and speculating. What used to be called
“a  theory”  in  the  pre-historical  age,  then  simply  “theory”  under  the  reign  of  Difference,
consisted in certain particular modes of tying these threads together. Some of these modes
may now seem obsolete, leading some analysts and critics to claim that “Theory is dead”.
Others are still practiced or seem appealing enough so that we may want to experiment with
them again, in which case it is just as accurate to say that “Theory is alive and well”.
These four activities constitute four different modalities of what has been referred to as
“interpretation”, so that we could highjack von Clausewitz’s famous statement describing war
as the continuation of politics by other means, and conceive interpretation as the continuation
of theory by other means.  To clarify this  claim,  I will briefly refer to the special  case of
literary theory, which can help us understand the broader articulation between interpretation
and theory.
Let’s recall the opening claim made by Knapp and Benn Michael in their declaration of
war  “Against  Theory”:  “By ‘theory’  we  mean  a  special  project  in  literary  criticism:  the
attempt  to  govern  interpretations  of  particular  texts  by  appealing  to  an  account  of
interpretation in general”. Theory has been perceived as imperialistic, hegemonic, because of
its claim to look at things from above: it pretended to provide a general “account”, valid for
all practical acts of reading, and it pretended to “model” the proper way to read any text,
imposed from the top in the name of some superior form of intelligence. Hence my current
MA  students’  perception  that  theory  is  abstract,  overly  general,  cut  from  the  reality  of
concrete issues, unrelated to what really counts (“practice”). In other words, theory is blamed
for being (purely) “theoretical”.
If we consider any act of intellection as the weaving of the four dimensions listed above,
we see that accounting and modeling, as well as speculating, do indeed introduce a certain
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“view from above”. We also realize, however, that the activity of accounting, in its necessary
concreteness, and that the wayfaring progression of the storyteller, also included in the mix,
contain potential antidotes to traditional excesses of the superior gaze.
More importantly, and much more radically, we realize that the traditional distinction
and rivalry between “theory” and “practice”, between the superior status of theory prescribing
how  to  read  all  discourses  and  the  practical  interpretations  of  concrete  texts  rests  on  a
deceptive opposition. There can be no accounting, modeling, storytelling or speculating “in
general”: we must necessarily count something given to our senses, model some specific chain
of events, tell  one particular story, speculate about  certain possible transformations of our
being. Similarly,  within the literary field, all theories claiming to provide universal models
accounting  for  the  working  of  any  possible  text  can  be  easily  shown to  result  from the
consideration of a certain specific corpus, which generated certain biases, certain sensibilities,
certain negligence, certain implicit norms and certain unduly exclusions. In other words, all
theories result from the attempt to generalize certain given interpretations. 
Conversely, there can be no interpretation which does not rest (implicitly or explicitly)
on a certain generalization, prescribing what there is to look for in a text, how to look for it
and why.  Over the past half-century,  from Hans-Georg Gadamer to Roland Barthes, from
Umberto Eco to Michel Charles, literary theory has shown how literary interpretations are
permeated  thru  and  thru  with  a  complex  interplay  of  welcoming  a  fundamentally  alien
message  (Blanchot  1989,  277),  of  projecting  a  hallucinated  meaning (Fish,1981,  394),  of
simultaneously  describing,  prescribing  and  performing  the  text  (Shustermann  1984,  237),
making it impossible to maintain a clear-cut opposition between construing (that which is
given by the text) and constructing (that which only appears because one has made oneself
attentive to its presence) (Fish, 1981, 394). The interpretive practice is precisely located at the
intersection of both movements: it requires both an attentiveness to what’s there (in the text)
and a pre-existing model which pre-conditions our attention.
We now see more clearly where Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels had it wrong
when they called for theory to “come to an end”. When claiming that theory “has no practical
consequences, not because it can never be united with practice, but because it can never be
separated from practice” (Knapp & Benn Michaels 1982, 741), they were right to state that
theory  and  practice  cannot  be  fully  separated,  since  interpretation  necessarily  requires
accounting and modeling, observing and speculating. However, they flattened (and therefore
killed) the interpretive operation by failing to account for the necessary movement back and
forth—or rather  up and  down—which is at  the core of its dynamics.  Far from calling for
theory to come to an end, we need it to keep trying to “reach a position outside practice”—
above it—because this attempt, although it necessarily produces deceptive and disappointing
results, is constitutive of the interpretive gesture, and of intellection at large.
Accounting, modeling, storytelling, speculating are all various forms of interpretation:
they result from a certain sensitivity to what’s there, as this sensitivity has been structured by
the  principle  of  relevance,  which  emerges  from  the  interface  between  functional  needs,
practical interests and cognitive schemes. Theory and interpretation are inseparable, although
permanently on the verge of undermining and overcoming each other. To same the same thing
differently: interpretation is the humble and practical reality of theory. Or, to return to Frank
Zappa: theory is not dead, it just smells like interpretation.
Indisciplinarity
It is now time to explore a structural tension between the four dimensions of intellection,
a.k.a.  modalities  of  interpretation,  described  above.  Accounting  and  modeling  are  often
performed along intuitive lines, as it is the case when I look at a crowd and estimate there are
about a hundred people in the room, or when I correlate a recurring computer crash with a
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certain  ill-fated  combination  of  operations.  Accounting  and  modeling,  however,  can  be
subjected to highly disciplined procedures of observation and explanation, which we tend to
identify with “the scientific method”. These two dimensions are better-suited to pursue the
disciplinary ideal which carried “theories” in their  pre-historical  age,  along with a certain
articulation between power and knowledge.
By contrast,  storytelling  and  speculating  can  be  perceived  as  the  representatives  of
difference-sensitive theory, insofar as they tend to “resist” our best efforts to submit them to
any form of well-disciplined method. In spite of analytical philosophy’s imperialist attempts
to formalize  and normalize  the (only)  “proper way to think”,  storytelling  and speculating
remain closer to arts, crafts, virtuosities, “bricolages”, based on intuitive skills rather than
rigid and reproducible  techniques.  Their  most  significant  steps forward—if it  even makes
sense to describe them within any form of “progressive” evolution,  which remains highly
debatable—tend to come from indisciplined gestures which challenge and upset the way one
used to tell stories or speculate. 
In order better to understand the dynamic tension between these two sets of modalities
of interpretation (disciplined  vs. indisciplined), we need to take a step aside, and reconsider
the  relation  between  disciplinarity,  inter-disciplinarity  and  what  some  of  us  attempt  to
designate as “in-disciplinarity”.
At the dawn of the 21th century,  intelligence has to be conceived along reconfigured
lines.  It  is  no longer  enough to be an “expert”  in  a  specific  field.  Cognitive  competence
increasingly requires the ability to draw transversal connections not only between different
disciplines  but  also,  more  crucially,  between  different  levels  of  perception of  the  same
problems. It is no longer enough  horizontally  to mix points of view coming from different
disciplines,  as  inter-disciplinary approaches  have  done for  a  number  of  decades.  A more
drastic reshuffling of the cards is necessary, in order vertically to integrate different strata of
knowledge and perceptions. 
Of course, sociologists should speak with economists, and literary critics should speak
with historians, in order, for instance, to understand why a population may be led massively to
vote for a xenophobic party. But this type of horizontal crossing of points of view leaves out
the  vertical articulation  between  the  experts  (sociologists,  economists,  literary  critics,
historians,  etc.)  and  the  decision-makers,  the  news-providers,  the  readers,  the  voters,  the
consumers – all agents and instances who not only react to the (inter-)disciplinary knowledge
provided by the experts, but who also  shape  the public debates and determine  the types of
questions about which (inter-)disciplinary experts will have to share their views.  
Such a  vertical  integration—to  which  we can  refer  with  the  term  indisciplinarity—
responds to a triple necessity.  First, it is made urgent by the fact that each of us already is,
and will increasingly be, called upon to be simultaneously an expert (in one field or another)
and a decision-maker (be it merely in terms of a decision to vote for A rather than B) and a
news-provider (be it merely in terms of our daily conversations with our friends) and a father
and a son  and a polluter  and a consumer (among many other things). We are increasingly
caught in schizophrenic contradictions between our interests as shoppers (who look for the
lowest  available  price  tag)  and  as  wage-earners  (who  need  good  jobs  to  remain  in  our
countries), between our desire to find fulfilment on the workplace and our need to detach
ourselves from our professional self.  Because the positions we defend as experts both are
influenced  by,  and  influence  in  return,  these  other  parameters  of  our  existence,  an
indisciplinary reflection about the vertical integration of our multileveled selves is the only
alternative to a collective collapse into schizophrenia.
Indisciplinarity  is  also  made  urgent  by  the  necessity  actively  to  build  the  type  of
argumentative common ground modern democracies need in order to be more than a formal
farce: an indisciplinary approach is required not so much to solve problems as to debate about
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which questions are of main importance and should be treated in priority—something which
no expert, nor any mere crossing of expert views, can decide. This, again, can only be settled
though the vertical integration of the many layers that compose our social forms of life.  
Finally, an indisciplinary attitude is required to foster the type of intellectual dissensus
and invention  that prevent public debates from turning around in repetitive and delusional
circles, within the structural circularity of the mediasphere. Here, indisciplinarity relays the
function of echoing and voicing dissidence, around which Wlad Godzich defined difference-
sensitive theory.
Indisciplinarity may be a new name, but its practice is as old as philosophy and literary
studies (Loty, 2005, 245). The arts in general, literature in particular, and “theory” in its short
lifespan  during  the  past  decades,  have  traditionally  played  the  role  of  an  indisciplinary
platform on which societal issues could be addressed in a way that could integrate rational
analysis and affective resonance, ethical questions and political positioning, judgement and
empathy.  It is therefore no surprise if indisciplinarity feels at home in literary,  artistic and
cultural studies. It is worrying, however, to see the traditional territory of indiscipline—the
Humanities—progressively lose their status, their place and their funding (Nussbaum, 2010,
163).
The  question  “What’s  left  of  theory  in  our  supposedly  post-theoretical  age?”  can
therefore receive at least two answers: first, as we saw above, what’s left is an inseparable and
intimate  articulation  between  theory  and  interpretation;  second,  what’s  left  is  an  urge  to
pursue the type of vertical integration characteristic of indisciplinarity. These two answers can
merge into one, when one realizes that interpretation is indisciplinary by nature: it tends to
make sense of our world by framing our observation along the points of view defined by our
practices (through the notion of relevance); it has to do so through a constant reinvention of
its procedures, of its sensitivities, of its meanings, in a dynamic which forces it to by-pass and
overflow any pre-defined disciplinary limitation. While the activity of reading can rest on the
simple recognition of features pre-determined by the proper knowledge of a certain code, the
activity  of  interpretation calls  for  the  necessary  questioning,  suspending,  supplementing,
reinventing of the pre-existing codes. The subject is in position to interpret when s/he has to
supply part of the code with its very act of deciphering (Citton, 2007, 363, 2010, 87 & 2011,
377).
While  melting  theory  into  indisciplinary  (and  indisciplined)  interpretation,  as  I  am
suggesting here, may have its advantages, it faces a serious problem, which I will address in
my  concluding  section:  does  interpretation  still  have  a  place  in  our  current  mediasphere
dominated by speed (Rosa, 2010), liquefaction (Bauman, 2000, 228) and the collapse of any
critical distance between the representation and the represented (Baudrillard, 1995, 164)? We
may not  have  made  any progress  by re-qualifying  our  post-theoretical  age  as  the  age  of
indisciplinary interpretation if, in our current modes of communicating, interpretation “smells
as funny” as theory.
From Interpretive Authority to Exemplary Gestures
Italian  critic  and  theorist  Daniele  Giglioli  has  provided  the  most  succinct  and  the
sharpest characterization of the possible demise of interpretation at the beginning of our third
millennium. In his article  “Three Circles.  Critique and Theory”,  he returns to the famous
declaration attributed to Karl Rove, George W. Bush’s spin doctor, who, responding to attacks
against White House policies, derided those journalists and editorialists living “in what we
call the reality-based community”, naïve enough to “believe that solutions emerge from [their]
judicious study of discernible reality”:
“That's not the way the world really works anymore,” he continued. “We're an
empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying
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that  reality—judiciously,  as  you  will—we'll  act  again,  creating  other  new realities,
which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors…
and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.” (Suskind, 2004, 44)
Karl (Rove) had taken Karl (Marx)’s eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach one step further. It
is not enough to call philosophers (i.e., theorists), who so far “have only interpreted the world
in various ways”, to now “change it”: in the 21st century, it belongs to spin doctors and PR
agencies to “create it”—without feeling any urge to account for “reality” as it is, and without
any sense of accountability for what will thus be created. This Baudrillardian twist, reclaimed
from French theorists and academic types in order to become the official doctrine of Empire’s
central intelligence agency, could indeed be perceived as both the apex and the collapse of
(difference-sensitive)  theory.  Disciplined,  methodic,  rational,  “objective”  accounting  and
modeling have been set aside, leaving an unlimited open field to manipulative storytelling
(with the triumph of spin doctors) and delusional speculation (with the unbound madness of
US narcissistic imperialism).
Within  this  broad  historical  context,  Daniele  Giglioli  identifies  three  major  crises
simultaneously affecting three correlated circles. The first circle is centered on  the crisis in
the  linguistic  paradigm,  whereby  linguistics  and  semiology  have  been  supplanted  by
cognitive sciences as the leader of the way we account for and model the social sciences. The
third circle is reconfigured by the crisis in secularization, whereby modernity’s critical stance
against religion and “superstition” not only appears as a denial of the constant resurgence of
the sacred in our social relations, but has ended up undermining any workable definition of
“the subject”. I will only dwell here on the second circle, which revolves around the end of
the hermeneutical paradigm, which sheds a dramatic new light on the (im)possible future of
theory as interpretation:
Interpretation has always configured itself as a practice to be applied to objects
whose value was already guaranteed. First the sacred book, then the law and, only from
the end of the  18th century,  the literary text  […] Only privileged texts (foundational,
decisive,  complex,  difficult)  have  the  right  to  be  interpreted.  In  claris  non  fit
interpretatio. That is why literary interpretation has managed to become, for a couple of
centuries, a respected profession, strengthened by the allied authority of knowledge and
power, culture and institutions, prestige and dignity, method and curriculum. (Giglioli,
2011, 23, translations mine)
Over  the  past  decades,  however,  the  process  of  commodification  and  of  mass-
communication has brought down this privileged status of (literary) interpretation:
“high-culture” texts have been progressively drowned into an ocean of symbolic
production  putting  on  the  market  objects  which,  one  could  say,  do not  desire to  be
interpreted.  Mass  communication,  cultural  industry,  mainstream,  labels  don’t  matter:
what matters is that a video clip, a commercial ad, a blockbuster movie are not to be
interpreted with the same instruments as a movie by Antonioni. Worse: they don’t call for
interpretation.  In front of such products—which are in overwhelming majority,  which
constitute the main process of acculturation of younger generations, which homogenize
our  global  mediascape,  which  generate  value,  because  they  are  sold  worldwide  and
because they impose their models on our perceptions—the interpretive posture is bound
to be a  fallacy.  There  is  nothing more  ridiculous than a professor  in  communication
laboriously analyzing a video clip to a teenager—who understands it much better than the
professor, in a blink, while simultaneously sending an SMS and chatting on Facebook.
Speed,  superficiality,  surfing,  distracted  attention  (already  noted  by  Benjamin  about
cinema), acceptance devoid of any anxiety about the abyss of simulation: such are the
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attitudes  requested  by  this  type  of  cultural  products—in  perfect  opposition  to  the
interpretive posture. (Giglioli, 2011, 24)
The demise of interpretation comes with a price to pay: the waning of the critical stance.
By pushing us to find another (deeper) meaning hidden under the surface of the text,  the
interpretive  attitude  was  a  strong  vector  of  potential  criticism,  leading  interpreters  and
theorists often to side with dissidents. Daniele Giglioli continues (and ends) the story of the
professionalization of the theorist sketched twenty years earlier by Wlad Godzich: “why in the
world should governments and capital pay a salary to professional debunkers? What are these
departments of Cultural Studies, where theory went to find shelter (sorry: to triumph), if not
places of enshrinement for subversives?” (Giglioli, 211, 25).
Instead of lamenting over the demise of interpretive authority, which was the remnant of
an old heavily hierarchical world we have few good reasons to regret, “critique and theory
should venture into a territory already within our reach, but still in need to be claimed and
appropriated”: 
Critique  and  theory  should  evolve  from interpretation  to  exemplification,  they
should consider themselves not so much as thought or communication than as gestures, as
performances, as events, as constitutive processes which provide themselves with their
own rules along the way of their unfolding. […] They should claim to those who listen:
what matters is not what I say, nor the method I use to say it, but rather the very fact that I
manage to speak through the techniques I use. Not: see what is in this text! But: see what
can be done by reading, hearing and scrutinizing this text! […] It is only by moving from
enunciation to gesture, from symbol to example, from discourse to action, that theory and
critique can still hope to have a future. (Giglioli, 2011, 26)
This appeal to stage interpretation as an exemplary gesture, purported to be contagious,
transductive,  electrifying—rather  than  as  an  authoritative  provider  of  hidden  truths—
remarkably  converges  with Wlad Godzich’s  call  for  a  theory whose “practice  consists  in
inventing gestures that are, at one and the same time, dedicated to the cry and a demand for an
accounting from the System” (Godzich, 1994,31, italics mine). The agency proper to theory-
as-interpretation is to be located in the inspiring and radiating power of the gesture: it rests on
the force of exemplarity at least as much as on the force of truth (Hampton, 1990,305).
Theoricolage
I will conclude this reflection by suggesting a final shift which may help entice more
future MA students to take courses in re-labeled (Literary) Theory. Modeling and speculation
need to be humbled down from their theoretical pedestal in the same manner as interpretation
needs  to  be  humbled  down  from  its  authoritative  hermeneutical  altar.  Theorists  and
interpreters should openly admit that—like all of us—they don’t really know what they say,
think or do. They try their best, but they don’t know. And they know they don’t know. And
they are not afraid (although still duly ashamed) of saying it.
My students are wise to be repelled by theoretical claims insofar as most of these claims
tended to be sickeningly arrogant. In order to neutralize such arrogance, which is probably
inherent to any form of assertion resting on an effort to include a view from above, I suggest
for  “Theory”  to  re-label  (and  reconceive)  itself  as  bricolage (a.k.a.,  do-it-yourself).  In  a
famous excerpt of  The Savage Mind, French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss contrasted
the techno-scientific approach illustrated by the engineer, the scientist or even the craftsman,
with the “primitive”, improvisational and “devious” approach illustrated by the “bricoleur”:
The “bricoleur” is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike
the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and
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tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments
is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with “whatever is at hand”, that
is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous
because  what  its  contain  bears  no  relation  to  the  current  project,  or  indeed  to  any
particular  project,  but  is  the contingent  result  of  all  the occasions there have been to
renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or
destructions. The set of the “bricoleur’s” means cannot therefore be defined in terms of a
project (which would presuppose besides, that, as in the case of the engineer, there were,
at least in theory, as many sets of tools and materials or “instrumental sets”, as there are
different kinds of projects). It is to be defined only by its potential use or, putting this
another way and in the language of the “bricoleur” himself,  because the elements are
collected or  retained on the principle  that  “they may always  come  in handy”.  (Lévi-
Strauss 1966, 20)
What people have practiced under the pompous term of “theory” has always been close
to what Lévi-Strauss describes as bricolage: no matter how well-versed we are in the existing
corpus of theoretical and methodological texts, we only operate with “a set of tools which is
always finite”—and always insufficient to do justice to the complex realities facing us. This is
why any interpretation  needs  to  be indisciplinary:  as  we inherit  them,  the disciplines  are
always necessarily  lacking, in constant need of supplementation, correction, sharpening and
weeding. They fail us when we try to account for the nuances of the text, or when we try to
model the peculiarities of the process we observe. They fail us because they were designed for
purposes which never fully coincide with ours. Ultimately, they fail us because they do not
emanate from the singularity of who we are and what our object is. Since all of us have to
“perform a large number of diverse tasks”, we constantly have to improvise new indisciplined
tools and skills.
Our set of tools, materials and skills is thus fatally “heterogeneous”. We have gathered
them along the way, not from a superior and integrative position endowed with a view from
above, but as wayfarers hunting and collecting opportunities as they crossed our wandering
path. Our toolbox is “the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or
enrich the stock”. When he states that “the set of the bricoleur’s means cannot be defined in
terms of a project”, Lévi-Strauss contrasts the bricoleur with the engineer, in a comparison
which sheds an interesting  light  on the difference  between the pre-historical  theories  and
difference-sensitive theory.  Jean-François Lyotard famously defined the postmodern by the
liquidation of modernity’s conception of itself in terms of  project (Lyotard, 1993. Since we
are not too sure of what to project nor of what to expect, we better equip ourselves with
whatever may “come in handy”. While the disciplined technician tends to become hostage to
the narrow set of specific tools he has devised for his pre-determined project, the indisciplined
bricoleur,  facing an undetermined future,  attempts to maximize his polyvalence.  His main
question is identical to the one raised by Daniele Giglioli in order to justify the exemplary
gesture of interpretation:  not “how can we accomplish this project most  efficiently?”,  but
“what can be done by reading, hearing and scrutinizing this text?”
Beyond, beside or within the wide diversity of our intellectual activities, our various
modalities of interpretation can participate in a common exemplarity if they conceive and
stage themselves as gestures of bricolage. What interesting things can we do with what is at
hand? Answering this  question may be a less ambitious  than providing a grand theory of
politics,  literature  or  history.  But  its  very  humility  and practicality  may help  draw more
students to our classrooms.
It  would  be  deceptive,  however,  to  see  bricolage  as  an  alternative  to  theory.  The
exemplary nature of the interpretive gesture results from the fact that it attempts to conciliate,
rather than oppose, theory with bricolage—generating a hybrid we could baptize theoricolage.
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If the bricoleur’s versatility results from his attempt “always to make do with ‘whatever is at
hand’”, his horizon is limited by the fact that “his universe of instruments is closed”. And this
is why we need interpretation to be the continuation of theory by other means, rather than its
replacement  or  burial.  The  theoretical  drive  which  expresses  itself  in  the  activity  of
speculation  is  more necessary than ever,  if  we are to  expand our universe of instruments
beyond its current limitation and closure.
As examples of such theoricolage,  one could look at the current work developed by
French theorist-poet-editor-activist Christophe Hanna. In an important collection of essays, he
reconstructs literary theory as a sub-branch of ufology (Hanna 2010 and Hanna 2011a). In a
brief article, he observes his students, as they tease policemen when demonstrating against
governmental  policies,  and  uses  their  provocative  gestures  to  model  what  political
interventions can look like under our regimes of surveillance and control (Hanna 2011b). In a
“statistical novel”, published under the pseudo of La Rédaction, he aggregates the responses
collected from dozens of people who happen to have Berthier for their family name, to whom
he asked a series of questions about a 1993 hostage situation which dramatically increased
Nicolas Sarkozy’s visibility as a young politician‒‒the point being to count and describe how
we, as media consumers,  re-model  historical events when we remember and re-tell  media
stories (Hanna 2012). Accounting, modeling, storytelling, speculating: our four dimensions of
intellection are interwoven through the medium of books, forewords, articles, websites, but
also art practices, installations, and even phonecalls… Christophe Hanna’s multidimensional
theoricolages are impressive and compelling for their invention and far-reaching stakes, while
always remaining tongue-in-cheek.At this conclusive point, another tension emerges within
our four dimensions of intellection. While accounting and storytelling can be located on the
side “the given” (data), of which we try to make sense, the main function of modeling and
speculating  seems  oriented  towards  the  expansion  of  our  toolboxes  and horizon.  We are
bound to count and narrate the given with the imperfect and often blunt tools available as we
walk along the path of life; by devising explanatory models and speculation, however, we can
hope to sharpen, expand and enrich our set of instruments.
We  need  theoricolage  to  pursue  the  search  for  new  tools  (concepts,  contraptions,
devices and tricks) which animated theory in its pre-historical as well as in its historical age—
whether to foster our power and knowledge, or to make ourselves more sensitive to the cries
and  promises  of  dissidence.  We  simultaneously  need  theoricolage  humbly  to  stage  its
fragility, in its necessary but nevertheless ridiculous and often comical attempt to comprehend
that which cannot be (fully) comprehended. The interpretive gesture can be truly exemplary
only if it manages to disarm its unsustainable pretention to truth and authority (Citton 2011,
377). 
Indiscipline will be all the more effective if it  appeals to joyous and cheerful souls,
rather than to subdued and obedient minds. The fact that theory smells “funny” may be, after
all, excellent news—if only this sort of “fun” keeps us from taking ourselves too seriously.
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